
/^ 



Gnerson's Cavalry Raid 

By S. A. FORBES. 
Formerly Captain Company B, Seventh Illinois Cavalry. 



Address before the Illinois State Historical Society, at its Eighth 

Annual Meeting, Springfield, 111., 

January 24. 1907. 



Reprinted from the Transactions of the Society. 



Grierson*s Cavalry Raid 



By S. A. FORBES. 



Formerly Captain Company B, Seventh Illinois Cavalry. 



Address before the Illinois State Historical Society, at its Eighth 

Annual Meeting, Springfield, III., 

January 24, 1907. 



Reprinted from the Transactions of the Society. 



MAP 

SHOWKS COURSE 
OF 

GRIERSONS RAID 







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Oime?i<^ Tni 

\0fr 31 \wm 




GEN. BENJAMIN H. GRIERSON. 



GRIERSON'S CAVALRY RAID. 

By S. A. Forbes. 
Koriuorl.v t'aptain. Coini)an.v 15. Seventh Illinois Cavalry. 



Tlie Grierson raid, made in April, 1863, from Lagrange, in western 
Tennessee, to Baton Rouge. Louisiana, was the first of the great fed- 
eral cavalry raids of the Civil War, and one of the most brilliantly 
successful. It was a rapid ride of some six hundred miles* through 
the heart of the enemy's country, made by a mounted force of less 
than a thousand men.f belonging to two Illinois regiments, the Sixth 
and Seventh Cavalry, commanded by B. H. Grierson, colonel of the 
Sixth. It had for its principal object the destruction of the railways 
in the rear of Vicksburg, the sole remaining means of transportation 
of supplies and men to that Confederate stronghold at a time when 
both supplies and men were desperately needed. 

The force which made the ride to Baton Rouge consisted wholly of 
Illinois men, under an Illinois leader, although the Second Iowa Cav- 
alry, belonging to the same brigade, accompanied the column for the 
first four days, and was then sent back to the starting point as a foil 
to the pursuit. When I add that the commander of the district under 
whose direction the expedition was planned and by whose orders it 
was set on foot, was Major-General S. A. Ilurlbut, also an Illinoisan. 
a citizen of Belvidere, and that his immediate superioi*, by whose final 
authority the raid was made, was General U. S. Grant of Illinois. I 
doubt not that it will be conceded that the history of this Mississippi 
campaign may properly enough be called a legitimate part of the 
history of this State. 

It was my good fortune to make this ride, a youth of 18 at the time, 
first sergeant of a company of the Seventh Illinois, of which my 
brother. H. C. Forbes, was captain. It was my first experience in a 
free field after seven months' absence from my regiment, four of them 
in a southern prison and three in a northern hospital following there- 
upon. It naturally made a vivid impression at the time, one which 
has bv no means wholly faded yet, and I am sure the reader will 
])ardon me if. in the course of this paper. I sometimes fail to keep the 
even pace of the calm historian or to muster the items of this narrative 
in perfectly correct perspective. 



•Orlerson's Report. Relx-llion Records Ser. I. vol. 24, pt. I, p. 528. 
IGrierson's Report. Reb. Rec, Ser. I. vol. 24, pt. I, p. 523. 



I have had, in preparing it, the great advantage of a voluminous 
manuscript upon the subject, left at his death by my brother, Captain 
H. C. Forbes, afterwards lieutenant-colonel of his regiment and brevet 
colonel of volunteers, and I have consulted all the official reports, dis- 
patches, and other papers on the raid printed in the various volumes 
of the records of the rebellion.* I have also made occasional use of a 
contemporary personal narrative by a sergeant of the Seventh Illinois 
Cavalry, Mr. R. W. Surby, published by him in 1865 ;t and have col- 
lected a considerable number of articles from newspapers, northern 
and southern, printed in the early part of 1863. 

During the late winter and early spring of 1863 the center of mili- 
tary interest in the Mississippi valley was at Vicksburg, where all 
things were shaping themselves towards the tragic climax of the con- 
federate surrender on the following July 4. Grant was about to shift 
his army, on the west side of the river, by land from Milliken's Bend 
above that point to Bruinsburg below it, and, crossing the river there, 
to swing to the north and east through Mississippi, breaking loose from 
his base of supplies and investing Vicksburg from the rear. Pember- 
ton, at Jackson, was in command of the confederate forces in Missis- 
sippi and eastern Louisiana. The confederate General Gardner was 
at Port Hudson with some 20,000 men, 1,400 of them cavalry J and the 
federal General Augur was at Baton Rouge. Grand Gulf, thirty miles 
below Vicksburg, was occupied by the confederate General Bowen ; 
Port Gibson, by a small confederate cavalry force under Colonel Wirt 
Adams ;§ and Natchez, by a still smaller one, a part of Adams' regi- 
ment, under Captain Cleveland.il 

In central Tennessee the armies under Rosecrans and Bragg were 
confronting each other at Murfreesboro and Tullahoma, respectively, 
both slowly recovering from the effects of the battle of Stone river — 
terrific to victor and victim alike — and 'each mainly interested, for the 
time, in keeping the other from reinforcing either Grant on the one 
hand or Pemberton on the other. 

In northern Mississippi and western Tennessee two parties to an 
approaching conflict were facing each other on either side of the 
interstate boundary, the northern party strung along the old Memphis 
and Charleston railroad, from Memphis on the west to Corinth on the 
east ; and the southern party, less compactly formed — rather loosely 
scattered, indeed — through the northern part of Mississippi, with 
Panola, on the Tallahatchie, at its western end and Columbu^ at its 
eastern. This difference in formation was partly due to the fact that 



♦The War of tho Robellion — a Compilation of thei Official Records of the Union and 
Confederate Armies; Sor. I, vol. XXIV. I'arts I and III. Cited in these notes as Reb 
rec, vol. 24. pts. I and III ; or R. R. L'4, pts. I and III. 

tGrierson's Raids, and Hatch's Sixt.v-four Days' March, with Biographical Sketches, 
and the IJie and Adventures of Chickasaw, the Scout. By R. W. Surby, ChicaRO. 1865. 
Cited here as "Surby". This srraphic narrative by a sergeant of the Seventh Illinois 
Cavalry, well known to the present writer, althoush marred by many typographical 
errors, especially in local and personal names, is entirely reliable as to matters which 
came under the author's personal observations, and commonly so as to events occurrin"- 
in his immediate neighborhood. " 

ifDepartment Returns. March .^1, 18G.S. Reb. rec., ser. I. vol. 24, pt. Ill p 702 
But see Gardner to Peml)€rton. April 29, pt. Ill, p. 80."?. ' 

§Col. Wirt Adams to General Pemberton, April 20, 1863. Reb. rec, ser I vol 24 
pt. I. p. 5:5."?. ■ ' ' 

II Report of Capt. S. B. Cleveland. April 28. Reb. rec. ser. I, vol. 24 pt I n 5H&' 
and Col. Wirt Adams to Gen. Pembea-ton. April 20, p. 533. ' ' 




IIlOMiY CLINTON FOUBKS, 

Lieutenant Colonel and Brevet Colonel Seventh Illinois Cavalry. Captain of Company 
B. at the time of Grierson's Raid. 



the confederates were holding two nortli and south roads, the Mis- 
sissippi Central and the Mobile and Ohio, while the line held by the 
federals ran east and west. Hurlbut of Illinois was at Memphis as 
district commander in charge of the northern line. Dodge was at Cor- 
inth and Sooy Smith had his headquarters at Lagrange, about mid- 
way between, holding the railroad with some 10,000 men, the Second 
Iowa and the Sixth and Seventh Illinois Cavalry regiments among 
them.* Chalmers was in charge of the western part of the confederate 
forces, with headquarters at Panola, where he had about a thousand 
cavalry and a battery of artillery; f and Ruggles, at Columbus, was in 
command of about 2,000 men on the eastern side of the state, | both 
generals taking their orders from Pemberton direct. Chalmers' dis- 
trict extended to New Albany, on the Tallahatchie,§ and his picket line 
was on that stream to the east, and to the west on the Coldwater, south 
of Memphis. Ruggles' advance post was at Verona, || south of Cor- 
inth, with a picket north to Baldwyn. and his district extended west 
to New Albany. From this point to Panola there was no occupied 
post, the country being covered only by occasional scouting parties, 
pickets and patrols. It will be seen that this southern line, if line it 
can be called, had no common commander corresponding to Hurlbut 
on the north, and that it had no center guard opposed to Sooy Smith 
at Lagrange — defects of organization and position to which the sub- 
sequent confederate disaster was in great measure due. Northern 
Mississippi had. indeed, been largely stripped of cavalry in January, 
when General \'an Doni was sent to eastern Tennessee with 5,000 
mounted men to rejx)rt to Bragg.^ The famous Forrest was also in 
Tennessee, at Shelbyville, under Van Dorn's command. 

Such was the situation in April, when there swarmed out from the 
north, suddenly and almost simultaneously, five swiftly moving col- 
umns, two of them cavalry raids, and the others feints or diversions 
made in aid or support of these two. Colonel A. D. Streight, sent by 
Rosecrans, from Nashville, a long roundabout way, down the Cum- 
berland and up the Tennessee, with alxnit 1,900 men to Eastport. Ala- 
bama, left the Tennessee river there and started east and south through 
northern Alabama to destroy railroads, stores and manufactories. His 
force was wretchedly mounted, mainly on mules secured after the 
start, and Forrest's excellent cavalry, dropping down from Shelbyville 
on his rear, presently overtook and surrounded him and captured his 
whole command near Rome, Georgia, on the 3d of May. Partly to sup- 
])ort Streight's expedition, but mainly to draw the confederate cavalry 
to the east, away from the line of march of the Grierson raid about 
to start from Lagrange, Dodge left Corinth for Tuscumbia April 16 

•Department returns, April 30, First Dlv., 16th Army Corps. R. R., I, vol. 24, pt 
III. p. 249: see also p. 2.53. 

tDcpartment Returns. March 31. R. R. I, vol. 24. pt. III. p. 702. See also Hurlbut 
to Grant April 1. pt. I, p. 27. General Hurlbut estimated Chalmers' force at l.SOO 
cavalry and one bntterv. Hurlbut to W. S. Smith. April 10. pt. Ill, p. 185. 

tR. R.. 24. pt. III. p. 702. 

§<;en<Mal Orders No. 0.'{. R. R.. voL 24. pt. III. p. 713. 

II Hurlbut to Grant. April 1. 1{. R.. s.m-. I. vol. 24. pt. I. p. 26. 

ilReport of General .T. 1',. .Tohnston to Adjutant General Cooper. R. R.. vol. 24. pt. I, 
p. 247. Reroort of Maj. Wm. I>. Rlaikburn. .lanuarv :W. pt. I. p. .^,.'^4. Dodge to Hamil- 
ton, Feb. 12, pt. Ill, p. 46. 



with 5,000 men,'' met Streiglit there April 24. went with him to Court- 
land, in Lawrence county, and returned to Corinth on the 2d of May. 
The effect of this movement in concentrating Ruggles' cavalry to the 
north and east is shown by Pemberton's order to Ruggles of April 19, 
that he should send all his mounted troops towards Corinth to create 
a diversion in favor of Roddy at Tuscumbiaf thus threatened by 
Dodge. 

Simultaneously with these movements at the eastern end of our 
line, a mixed force of infantry, cavalry and artillery moved south from 
Memphis to the Coldwater, twenty-five miles away on the Panola road, 
as if to drive Chalmers from his headquarters -,1 and on the following 
day another column of three regiments of infantry with a battery of 
artillery, under Sooy Smith, moved diagonally southwest from La- 
grange to the same objective, in the hope of cutting Chalmers off.§ 
Although the Memphis column failed to cross the Coldwater, and 
Chalmers eluded Smith, he was kept completely occupied until April 

23, when he returned to Panola. 

And now, with the thin confederate line in northern Mississip]^ 
thus completely pulled apart and piled up at its ends, there suddenly 
shot down through its abandoned center a slender column of 1,500 
cavalry, thrust, like a nimble sword through an unguarded point, into 
the very vitals of the confederate position. || Seasoned soldiers, most 
of them, well mounted and well armed, fresh from a winter's rest in 
camp (if cavalry can ever be said to rest), gay with youth and the 
hope of fresh adventure, with no baggage to encumber them save 
what was strapped to their saddles-, carrying each forty rounds of 
ammunition, five days' rations and a good supply of salt, they were an 
exceptionally fit party for a hard and rapid cavalry raid — and hard 
and rapid this ride was to be, taxing to its limit the physical endurance 
of nearly every man, and putting a stVain on the mental resources of 
its leaders which doubtless no one else can fully realize. 

A cavalry raid at its best is essentially a game of strategy and speed, 
with personal violence as an incidental complication. It is played 
according to more or less definite rules, not inconsistent, indeed, with 
the players' killing each other if the game cannot be won in any other 
way; but it is commonly a strenuous game, rather than a bloody 
one, intensely exciting, but not necessarily very dangerous. This nar- 
rative will consequently be without the grim and gory feature? of 

♦Hurlbut to Halleck, April 18. R. R. vol. 24, pt. Ill, p. 206. 

tReport of I.ieut.-General .T. C. Pemborton. R. R., 24, pt. I, p. 253. 

tLauman to Bryan, April 17. R. R., 24, pt. III. p. 20.3. Hurlbut to Halleck, April 
18, p. 20(5. lirvan to Randall. April 25, pt. I. p. 557. 

§Hurlbut to Smith, April 15, par. 2, R. R., 24, pt. Ill, p. 190, Hurlbut to Kelton, 
Mav 5, par. 5 and 6, pt. I, p. 520. Smith to Ilurllnit, April 2?,. p. 555. Hurlbut to 
Rawlins. April 25, p. 555. Chalmers to Pembcrton, April 2?,, p. 563,. 

II See IInrlI)ut to Rawlins, April 17, 1863. "These various movBiments along our 
length of lino will, 1 hope, so distract their attention that Grierson's party will get a 
fair start and be well down to their destination before thejy can be resisted by adenuate 
force, Ood speed him, for he has started gallantly on a long and perilous ride." — R R 

24, pt. Ill, p. 202. See also Hurlbut to Rawlins, May 5, 1863. "The movement on 
Tuscumbia on one side drew attention and gathered their cavalry in that direction, 
whi'e the movement on Coldwater and I'anola drew Chalmers and his band in the other! 
Thus our gallant soldier, Grierson. proceeded with his command unchallenged." Vol.' 
24. pt. HI, p. 276. Pemberton writers to .Johnston, April 20 : "Barteau's command 
gallantly fought and repulsed a column of the enemy at Birmingham" [referring to 
Hatch.!" "Chalmers was occupied witli another column from ]SIemi)his. moving l)y the 
Hernando road, but there was no force to oppose to Grierson's, a well-equipped and 
w/^ll-mounted force." Vol. 24, pt. Ill, p. 803. 



most tales of war, but will tell instead of the rapid march, the subtle 
ruse, the gallant dash, the sudden surprise, and the quick and cunning 
retreat which leaves an opponent miles in the rear before he knows 
that the tight is over. 

It was on the 17th of April, 1863,* the day after Dodge's start to 
the east from Corinth and Bryan's start to the south from Memphis — 
the day of Sooy Smith's march from Lagrange towards Panola — that 
the three regiments were set in motion; and just as the sun rose full 
and fine over a charming expanse of small pine-clad hills, the first brig- 
ade, stretching itself slowly out from the little village, slid like a huge 
serpent into the cover of the Mississippi woods. 

In the northern third of the state the streams run southwest into 
the Mississippi and southeast into the Tombigbee, leaving the second 
tier of counties from the east as a watershed. Along this watershed 
the course of the column lay, approximately parallel for about eighty 
miles to the Mobile and Ohio railroad, distant from twelve to twenty-five 
miles to the east. As this road was held by Ruggles up to within 
thirty miles of Corinth, Grierson was particularly exposed, in this 
stage of his movement, both to flank attack and to pursuit in force 
sufficient greatly to embarrass and delay, if not finally to defeat, his 
expedition. It was his first object, consequently, after getting fairly 
under way, to confuse and mislead the enemy as to the scope and 
object of his plans and to draw him off, if possible, in pursuit of a 
detachment thrown out as a decoy, leaving the main column to pursue 
its way unhindered. On the third day of the raid, after the command 
had crossed the Tallahatchie at and near New Albany, three detach- 
ments were sent out by Grierson in as many diflFerent directions — 
two of them moving against camps of state troops in process of organi- 
zation, with a view to creating the impression that it was the whole 
object of the raid to break up these camps. f A demonstration towards 
one of them at Chesterville, to Grierson's left, drew to that point the 
attention of Colonel C. R. Barteau,J in command of all the con- 
federate cavalry in the northeast part of the state, § and he marched 
with a regiment to that place for its defense. If he had followed up 
the retiring federal detachment, he would have come at once upon 
Grierson's column ; but instead of this he fell back some fifteen miles 
to the south and east to cover Okolona and Aberdeen, important rail- 
road points which he thought were threatened. || Finding that he was 
not pursued, he moved northwest again to Pontotoc,^ and learning 
there that Grierson had already passed to the south.** he immediately 
gave pursuit with his own regiment, a regiment of state troops, two 
additional battalions, and three pieces of artillery. That night he 

♦(irierson to Rawlins, May ">. I{. K., 24. pt. I, p. r>22. 

•>(;riprson to Uawlins, May 5, K. R., 24. pt. I, p. 523. 

tBartoau to Ilooe, R. R., 24. pt. I, p. .">:?4. 

§Clrcular of AA\. B. A. Smith, April 5, R. R., 24. pt. Ill, p. TUi. 

llBartoaii to Hooe. April .^O, IL R. 24, pt. I, p. 534. 

•Barteaii to IIooo. .\pril :'.0. R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 534. RupRlos to Pemberton, April 20, 
p. 551. 

•*The rotiirn, April 20 from Pontotoc to Lagrange of 175 of the least effective men, 
together with prisoners, led horses, and a single gnn of the battery, was managed with 
the intention of leading any pursuing force to iielieve that the whole column had 
turned back. R. R. 24. pt. I. pp. 523. 534. .\s it had no such consequence, however, 
I have not mentioned it in the text. 



8 

rested for three hours within thirteen miles of Grierson's camp, 
which he reached next day two hours after Grierson had gone on.* 

Then came a lucky stroke of strategy, by which this strong pursuing 
force was lured away from the track of the column and led no less 
than fifty miles to the northf in pursuit of a regiment detached by 
Grierson" to return to Lagrange. On April 21, the fourth day of the 
raid, when about eighteen miles below Houston, the county seat of 
Chickasaw county, Grierson sent Colonel Hatch with the Second Iowa 
Cavalry, numbering about 500 men,;}: to the west and south on the 
West Point road, with orders involving a very ambitious program of 
capture and destruction for so small a force. Striking the Mobile and 
Ohio road where it crosses the Okatibbehah near West Point, and de- 
stroying the bridge across that stream, Hatch was next to move rap- 
idly south to Macon for the destruction of railroad and government 
stores, and swinging around to the east and north, was to take Colum- 
bus, if possible, to break up the railroad south of Okolona, and then 
to return to Lagrange. 

On hearing of the arrival of the raid at Pontotoc, Ruggles had sur- 
mised that its principal object was the destruction of these very rail- 
road bridges at Macon and West Point,§ and had taken his defensive 
measures accordingly. Pemberton had also ordered troops from 
Meridian northward to report to Ruggles on the preceding day,|| and 
all threatened points were thus more or less thoroughly guarded 
against attack. Fortunately, perhaps, for Platch, Barteau's pursuing 
force was too near to permit him to become very deeply entangled in 
this dangerous enterprise. Coming, in his pursuit of Grierson, to the 
point wdiere Hatch and Grierson had parted, Barteau mistook the 
trail of the Second Iowa for that of the main command. "The enemy 
divided at this point," he says, "two hundred going to Starkville and 
seven hundred continuing their marph on the West Point road,"^ 
whereas the Starkville force was Grierson's column, containing now, 
after the withdrawal of Hatch, about 950 men.** Following up the 
Second Iowa Cavalry towards West Point, Barteau overtook it within 
about five miles and attacked it heavily in rear and on the flanks, the 
Second Alabama Cavalry barring its way at the same time towards 
West Point, ff Hatch thus suddenly found himself between two fires; 
but while Barteau was moving to the right and left, hoping to sur- 
round and capture him, he broke through the enveloping line to the 
rear and, retiring slowly northward, drew the enemy after him in a 
series of rear-end skirmishes which lasted until the 24th — the eighth 
day of the raid, and the very one on which Grierson reached the 

♦Barteau to Ilooe, April 30, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 534. 

tTo Molino, Miss. See Hatch to Harland, April 27, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 531. The force 
which attacked Hatch at Birminsham was that of Col. Barteau— not that of Chalmers, 
as Hatch supposed. Barteau to Hooe, April 30, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 536. 

iGrierson to Rawlins, May 5, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 523. Hatch to Harland, April 27, 
p. 5.10. 

|Rugf,'les to Momminger, May 13, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 5G0, par. 2 

III eiiiberton to commanding officer of troops at Meridian, April 22, and Pemberton 
to Ruggles, April 22, R. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 776. 



IBarteau to Hooe, April 30, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 534. 

•♦Grierson to Rawlins, May 5, R. R. 24, pt I, p 5'>3 
ttHatch to Harland, April 27, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 530, i 



gles. April 21, p. 552. ' ■' . " " "• "' ^^ ^ -" """' ''^''- ^- Cunningham to Rug- 




JOHN LYNCH, 
Colonel Sixth niinois Cavalry, Captain of Company E. at Time of Grierson Raid. 



Meridian and X'icksburg road. Touching the Mobile and (Jhio at Oko- 
lona, Hatch paused long enough to burn public property there, and 
finally reached Lagrange on the 26th.* 

Freed by this diversion of Barteau from all danger of j)ursuit, and 
with no enemy before him or within striking distance u])on either 
flank, Grierson was now well within the line of confederate defense, 
with no opposing force worth mentioning between him and his goal. 
His only chance of failure was in a correct interpretation of his move- 
ment by Pemberton, and the concentration of troops by rail across his 
line of march — a danger which induced still further feints against the 
Mobile and Ohio road, intended to keep confederate attention focused 
on the protection of that line. 

Unable to detach another considerable body for this purpose from 
his jjrincipal force, he sent out on his flank a. single company of thirty- 
five men under Captain H. C. Forbes of the Seventh Illinois,! with 
orders to approach Macon, on the railroad, and if possible to break 
the telegraph and the road in its vicinity and rejoin the main command. 
As this command was to be speeding southward in the meantime at its 
highest possible rate, the chance was very remote that this little band 
would ever rejoin their conu'ades. unless, indeed, in a confederate 
prison. 

Strangely enough, this fragment of a company, ludicrously inade- 
quate to its purpose as it seemed, accomplished quite as much as if it 
had been ten times as large. .Approaching -\lacon .\pril 22, it spent the 
night in bivouac within two and a half miles of that town, capturing 
from a patrol sent out from Macon as a scout, a prisoner, from whom 
it was learned that a train of infantry and artillery were hourly ex- 
pected from the south. This statement is confirmed by the report of 
Captain John Lynch| of the Sixth Illinois who, coming out from Lou- 
isville and approaching the town next morning by another road, with 
one companion, both in citizen's dress, found a picket on the road, 
from whom he learned that the place was held by two regiments of 
cavalry, a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery. § 

A Macon paper of the following day also reports the arrival, during 
the night, of two thousand men from Meridian, evidently pursuant 
to Pemberton's order of this date already mentioned. Except for the 
disturbance caused by this evening patrol, our little company slept 
as securely under the trees by the roadside as if protected by impreg- 
nable works, its sole defense against capture or death being the wildly 
exaggerated reports of the strength of the federal column which were 



•Hatch to Iliiiland, April 22. U. U. 24, pt. I, p. 5.S1. 

tGrlerson to Uawlins. Mav 5. R. R. 24, pt. I, p. .528, par. 2. 

tGrieiaon to Rawlins, .May 5, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 528, par. 4, Surby, p. 39. 

§"IIo went to the pickets at the tdge of the town," says Grlfisoh. '•ascfitainod the 
whole disposition of their forces and much otlier valiiahle information, and. returning, 
joined lis at Decatur, having ridden without Interruption two days and nights, without 
a moment's rest. All honor to tho gallant captain, who.sc intrepid coolness and daring 
characterized him on every occasion." Captain Ijynch. afterwards major, lieutenant- 
colonel, and colonel of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, now lives at Olney, Illinois. 



lO 

by this time flying through the country in all directions, growing as 
they flew. Our own little squad was believed in Macon that night to 
be the main body of the raid and to consist of 5,000 men.* 

Grierson, in the meantime, sped down through Starkville and Louis- 
ville on the 22d, secured the bridge across Pearl river by a stratagem 
of the advance on the morning of the 23d, f passed through Philadel- 
phia, in Neshoba county, at 3 :oo p. m., reached Decatur at day dawn 
of the 24th after an all-night ride, and struck the Meridian and Jackson 
road at Newton station, the object of his long swift ride, at 6:00 in 
the morning of this, the eighth day of the raid.;]; Here two trains of 
cars were captured and destroyed, one filled wath food and ammuni- 
tion, including several thousand loaded shells, and the other with ma- 
chinery and railroad ties.. Commissary and quartermaster's stores 
were burned, five hundred stand of arms were broken up, seventy-five 
prisoners were captured and paroled, and the railroad was wrecked 
and its bridges were burned (two of them about 150 feet long each) 
for four and a half miles to the east.§ The seriousness of the blow 
thus delivered is shown by Pemberton's statement to Gardner that 
there is danger that his supplies will be cut off,|| and by his earnest 
appeal, written six days later to the president of the road, urging him 
to repair the break in his line with the greatest possible expedition, as 
a large part of the supplies from the Vicksburg army must thereafter 
come over this road.^ Time was indeed precious to him when he 
wrote, for Grant's advance had just crossed the ]\Iississippi to the 
Vicksburg side, and in thirteen days more McPherson was at Clinton, 
between Vicksburg and Jackson, effectually destroying this same road. 

The confusion, uncertainty and concern wrought in confederate 
counsels by this daring raid,** are revealed in the multiplicity of orders 
sent out and the numerous, complex movements of considerable bodies 
of infantry, cavalry and artillery made in various parts of the state 
for the prevention of further mischief and the capture, if possible, of 
the venturesome party, now isolated in the midst of its foes. 

*"Repoi-t made the numbea- about 5,000, but it was reduced to one company of cav- 
alry, numbering about eighty men, which reached the residence of Mrs. Augustine, about 
two and a half miles from town at daylight [twilight] of Wednesday. They took 
supper there, and breakfast the next morning, when they ranged to the northwest por- 
tion of the county, robbing individuals and houses, in some cases, and providing them- 
selves with what provisions they wanted. They crossed the Noxubee at Crawford's 
bridge, taking with them several "citizens as prisoners. Young John Bryson they took 
while at Mrs. Augustine's place. He ventured within their lines with a gun in his 
hand and a uniform coat on. He is still a prisoner. * * * * Mr. Woodfin's parole 
we have seen. It is countersigned H. C. Forbes, commanding Co. C. [B. ] 7th Rv.^iment, 
111. Vol,. U. S. Army. * * * There was a very considerable stampede for twenty milea 
around in this county, the most of those running striking for the Bigbee to cross ove^ 
into Alabama. Now" that they have disappeared the general impression is that while 
they were near town tlie whoie company could have been captured by fifty well or.can- 
ized men under a proper leader. Mr. Dinsmore rode towards the camp, tied his horse 
in the woods, and walked 1o the quarters and inquired of the negroes if the Federals 
were there. They said they were in tlie house eating supper. Not ten men could lie raised 
about Macon to attack them. At o :00 o'clock in the morning 2.000 of our troops came 
up from :Meridian, but they were either not informed of the presence of the Federal 
company or did not choose to disturb the repose of our quondam friends."^ — Macon 
Bforon." quoted in I'aulding, (Miss.) Clarion of May 1, 1803. 

tSurby, p. 36. 

tGricrson's report. R. R., 24 pt. I. p. 524. 

§Gen .Tohn Adams reports to Pemberton April 25. that eleven bridges had been burned 
between Newton and Meridian. R. R., 24. pi. I. p. 531. See also Appendix, Note B, 
extract from the .Tackson Apprnl. 

llPemberton to Gardner, April 24. R. R.. 24, pt. I. p. 31o. 

llPemberton to President of Southern Railroad, April 30. R. R. 24. pt. I. p. 315. 

**"So great was the consternation crea.ted by this raid that it was impossible to ob- 
tain any reliable information of the eneiuy's movements, rumor placing him in various 
places at the same time." — T.ieut. General Pemberton's report on the Vicksburg Cam- 
paign, R. R., 24, pt. I, p. 253. 



II 

Pemberton first learned of the raid three days after its start,* and 
at once placed all the cavalry north of the Meridian road at the dis- 
posal of Ruggles and Chalmers,! Buford's infantry brigade, moving 
at this time by rail from Chattanooga to Jackson to reinforce Pember- 
ton, was stopped by him at Meridian April 22 and ordered up the 
road to Ruggles. | To intercept the raiders on their return to the 
north, after their arrival at Newton Station, Featherston's brigade was 
shifted from Fort Pemberton, on the Yazoo, east to Grenada ;§ Tilgh- 
man, at Canton, was ordered to mount one of his infantry regiments 
and sent half his force to meet Grierson if he came back by Carthage, || 
and Chalmers was ordered across the state from Panola to Okolona.f 
with 1,500 men. Ruggles also distributed his mounted troops to head 
off Grierson if he should return through northeast Mississippi.** On 
the Meridian line John Adams was moved, with his infantry, cavalry 
and artillery, from Jackson east to Morton, Forest and Lake;ff Lor- 
ing was ordered to mount as many men as he could along the Mobile 
& Ohio road ; || Stevenson, at Vicksburg, was directed to guard the Big 
Black river bridge and to keep in readiness for immediate movement 
all troops not absolutely necessary to hold his lines ; §§ and the governor 
of the state was urged to seize at once horses enough to mount a 
regiment of infantry. || || To prevent an escape of the federal column 
to the south, Gardner was ordered, April 24, to send his cavalry from 
Port Hudson east towards Tangipahoa, ^^ on the present Illinois Cen- 
tral railroad, and Simonton, at Ponchatoula, received similar orders.*** 

Even the capital of the state was thought by Pemberton to be endan- 
gered, and all possible precautions were taken against its capture. An 
appeal was issued to the citizens of the state to arm and organize for 
their own defense.ftf John Adams wared, April 25, to Johnston, in 
Tennessee, XH by Pemberton's direction, that Pemberton was "sorely 
pressed on all sides," and urgently desired that 2,000 cavalry be sent 
from the east to fall on Grierson's rear; and wired also to Buckner, 
commanding the department of the gulf : "All is lost unless you can 
send a regiment or two to Meridian. General Pemberton directs me 
to urge you to send"§§§ — an expression of panic and dismay which 

♦I'emberton to Johnston, .^pril 20. U. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 802. Pemberton to Ruggles, 
April 20, p. 770. 

tPemberton's report. R. H. 24, pt. I, p. 252. 

lPeniberton"s report, R. It. 24. pt. I, p. 25.3. Pemberton to commanding officer of 
troops at Meridian, April 22, pt. Ill, p. 776. Also Pemberton to Thompson, April 22, 
p. 777. 

§Pemberton to Keatherston, April 24, R. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 782. Penil)erton's report, 
pt. 1. p. 254. Smith to Hiirilnit, April 29, pt. I, p. 521. 

llPemlierton to Tilghman, April 24, R. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 7.S.!. 

IJPembertons report, R. R. 24. pt. I, p. 254. Smith to llurlbut, April 29. pt. I, p. 
521. Pemliirton to Chalmers, April 24, pt. Ill, p. 781. Pemberton to Johnston, Ajjril 
26, pt. III. p. 780. 

•♦Riigsles to Memminger, May l.S, R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 561. 

ttPeml)erton to Adams, April 24. R. R. 24, pt. III. p. 781. Adams to Pemberton, 
April 26, p. 789. Portis to Memminger, Apt-il 24, pt. I, p. 54G. 

ttpcmberlon's report, R. R. 24, i)t. t, p. 254. 

§§Pemberton to Stevenson, April 27, R. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 794. Tavlor to Stevenson, 
April 25, p. 788. 

IllPemberton to Pettns, April 25. R. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 786. 

Mi Pemberton's report. R. R. 24, pt. I, p. 254. I'emberton to Gardner, April 24. pt, 
III, p. 782. 

••♦Pemberton to Simonton, April 24, pt. Ill, p. 782. Simonton to Wilson, April 30, 
p. 55.'{. 

tttPemberton to Pettus. April 25, R. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 787. 

JtJAdams 1.. Pemberton. April 25. R. R. 24. pt. I, p. 5.32. 

Hi Adams to Pemberton, April 25, R. R. 24. pt. I, p. 532. 



12 

Pemberton repudiated, however, and ordered Adams to correct.* 

In the midst of all this hurry of orders and mustering and march- 
ing of men, Grierson's column, exhausted by its tremendous ride, and 
with harder riding yet to come, moved slowly south and west on the 
24th and 25th, with intervals of rest, and securing one good night's 
sleep. f Although the main object of the raid was not fully accom- 
plished, its most difficult problem, that of the escape of the command, 
was still to be solved. In entering the state from the north it had in 
its favor all the advantages of a surprise, and could also count on the 
enemy's ignorance of the numbers to be met. But surprise was now 
no longer possible, and the strength of the invading column had by 
this time been more or less correctly ascertained. 

Grierson's instructions, as he interpreted them, left him free to plan 
his escape according to his own judgment of the circumstances at the 
time, a fact due to his immediate superior, General William Sooy 
Smith, through whom Hurlbut's directions were transmitted to him. 
Hurlbut's written orders to Smith were dated April 10 and April 15,! 
the first a week and the last two days before the start. In the first he 
says : "Your three regiments of cavalry will strike out by the way of 
Pontotoc, breaking off right and left, commanding both roads [the 
Mississippi Central and the Mobile and Ohio] , destroying the wires, 
burning provisions and doing all the mischief they can, while one 
regiment ranges straight down to Selma or Meridian, breaking the 
east and west road thoroughly and sweeping back by Alabama." His 
latest order does not specify the line of Grierson's retreat after the 
destruction of the Meridian and Jackson road, but nevertheless im- 
plies a return to the north by saying, "he may be able to strike Jack- 
son or Columbus." 

Sooy Smith and Grierson had previously insisted with Hurlbut. in a 
conference at Memphis, that it would be far less hazardous for Grier- 
son to push on to Baton Rouge after breaking the Meridian road than 
to return through Alabama, but Hurlbut did not agree with them 
and directed a return to the north. § "This order," Sooy Smith writes 
me, II "I received late in an evening. I slept little that night, and in 
the morning sent for Grierson and told him to get ready for the raid 
as soon as possible. He asked me which plan had been adopted, and 
I told him he was to go to Baton Rouge." It was also understood 
between them that as soon as Grierson had passed the enemy's lines 
beyond the Tallahatchie, his communications with headquarters being 
cut off, he would have discretionary power.^ 



♦Pemberton to Adams, April 25, R. R. 24, pt. Ill, p. 785. 

tGrierson's report. R. R. 24, pt. I, pp. 525, 520. 

tninlbut to Smith. April 10 and 15, R. R. 24, pt. Ill, pp. 185 and 19(>. 

§1 find an inexplicable inconsistency between Hurlbut's written orders to Smith and 
his earlier reports, on the one hand, and his latest statements concerning his orders to 
Grierson, on the other. (See Hurlbut's orders to Sooy Smith, April 10, R. R. 24, pt 
III, p. 185. Hurlbut to Halleck, April 18, pt. Ill, p. "207. Hurlbut to Rawlins, April 
29, pt. I, p. 519. Hurlbut to Halleck, April 29, pt. Ill, p. 247. Hurlbut to Lincoln, 
May 2. pt. Ill, p. 204. Hurlbut to Kelton, May 5, pt. I, p. 520.1 That Hurlbut fully 
expected Grierson to return through Alabama is shown by his dispatch. April 29, of a 
relief column of three regiments undea- Hatch, from Lagrange toward Okolona and 
Columbus. (See Hurlbut to Rawlins, April 29, pt. I, p. 519. Sooy Smith to Hurlbut, 
April 29, p. 521. Hatch to Morgan, May 5. p. 579.) 

II Sooy Smith to S. A. Forbes, Nov. 10, 1005. See Appendix, Note A. 

•[Sooy Smith to S. A. Forbes, May 4, 1907. See Note A. 



13 

Feeling free, therefore, as he says, "to move in any direction from 
this point which in my judgment would be best for the safety of my 
command and the success of the expedition, I at once decided to move 
south, in order to secure the necessary rest and food for men and 
horses, and then to return to Lagrange through Alabama or to make 
for Baton Rouge, as I might thereafter deem best."* Hearing, how- 
ever, on the 25th that a fight was momentarily expected near Grand 
Gulf, he decided to make a rapid march in that direction instead, in 
the "endeavor to get upon the enemy's flank and cooperate with our 
forces should they be successful in the attack upon (irand Gulf and 
Port Gibson. "f His pursuit of this design carried him west and a 
little south to cross the New Orleans and Jackson railroad (now the 
Illinois Central) at Hazlehurst, thirty-three miles behiw Jackson, on 
April, 27, and to Union Church, in Jefferson county, bv the evening 
of the 28th. 

Although he was thus riding for four days approximately parallel 
to the road along which most of Pemberton's army lay, at distances 
varying from fifteen miles at the beginning to forty at the end, his 
march was unobstructed by the enemy until the 28th. Grierson, in 
his official report, speaks, indeed, of a regiment of confederate cav- 
alry from Brandon, on the Jackson road, fortunately encountered at 
night while headed directly for his own camp near Raleigh, and sent 
in the w^rong direction by one of his spies ;J and this same body is 
referred to in Surby's volume (p. 60) and also in my brother's manu- 
script, as a cavalry force of 1.800 men which company B was so for- 
tunate as to evade ; but a careful study of the locations and movements 
of the confederate troops on April 26 shows that this was a cavalry 
squadron only, headed by Captain R. C. Love, who was ordered by 
Pemberton on that day to leave Brandon, § ascertain where Grierson 
was, and if at Raleigh .to get on his rear, plant ambush and annoy him. 
Four days later Captain Love and his squadron were still in unsuc- 
cessful search of Grierson farther south. || 

It was owing to this midnight apparition of a force supposed to be 
dangerous, in his rear, that Grierson began burning all bridges as he 
crossed them,^ thus abandoning to its fate Company B of the Seventh, 
which he had evidently given up for lost. 

This gallant little party, it will be remembered, we left asleep by 
the roadside two and a half miles from Macon,- on the night of the 
22d. Satisfied, from the reports received, that it could accomplish 
nothing in the town itself, it undertook the next day to reach and burn 
the railroad bridge over the Noxubee river, a few miles below. But 
finding this to be strongly guarded, it marched in the afternoon 
towards Philadelphia, where it expected to strike Grierson's trail. 
Riding all night, except for two hours' rest at Pleasant Springs, it 



♦Grierson's report. Reb. tec, 24, pt. I. p. 525. 

tGrlerson's report. Ileb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. 525. See also Pemlierton to Boweii. .\prll 
27, pt. III. p. 702. 

JGrierson's report. Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. 525. 
fPemberton to Love. April 20, Reb. rec, 24, pt. III. p. 791. 
nPemberton to Love, April 2N. Keb. reci.. 24. pt. 111. p. 798. 
liGrierson's report. Rob. rec. 24. pt. I, p. ."j2(;. 



14 

reached Philadelphia about noon of the 24th, twenty-one hours after 
the column had passed. A skirmish with a company of home guards, 
organizing at this place for the pursuit of Grierson, resulted in the 
capture and parole of about thirty of them, the destruction of their 
firearms, the appropriation of their very welcome dinner, and the rapid 
consummation of several horse trades highly advantageous to the 
federal company, just then very much in need of a remount. As the 
horses of these home guards had been brought together to overtake 
Grierson, we gladly took them at their owners' estimate of their fit- 
ness for this task — which was also our own. 

We traveled always with two or three men, dressed and armed like 
confederates, riding some distance in advance, to collect information 
from citizens and to give us warning if they saw any signs of a hostile 
jforce. Coming, not far from Philadelphia, to a plantation house by the 
roadside, we stopped to feed, the bugle blowing the "halt" as a notice 
to this advance. They did not hear the call, however, and rode on 
alone. Presently we heard several shots fired far on ahead and knew 
that our scouts had met an enemy. Hurriedly mounting, we galloped 
down the road, and within about half a mile, as our horses bolted 
suddenly to the roadside, we saw one of our men, dead on his back in 
the middle of the road. His comrades presently came out of the 
brush, one uninjured, the other with a bullet in his arm. Three strag- 
glers from the confederate army, who had happened to be at a house 
near by, at which the scouts had stopped for information, charged them 
— truly enough — with being federal spies. Our men denied the 
charge, however, and tried to prolong the argument, expecting every 
moment to see us coming to their support, but the confederates finally 
fired on them and fled. 

It was a serious moment for us, not merely because we had lost a 
comrade, but because the men who had killed him were ahead of us 
and now knew who and what we were. The guerilla and the bush- 
whacker and the ambush by the roadside, familiar to us from two 
years' service in the field were in all our minds as we rode that day 
through the thickety woods, scanning every cover and watchful of 
every turn in the road. We were bound to outride this news of us, 
and that night we marched without a halt, arriving in the early dawn 
at Newton Station, still smoking with the fires which Grierson's men 
had kindled. Grierson had spent the night two miles west of Mon- 
trose, about nineteen miles to the south and west from Newton, and 
he moved the following day only seventeen miles still further to the 
south and west, camping near Leaf river, on the Raleigh road. A ride 
of thirty-six miles on the 25tli would thus have brought us to his col- 
umn. But we had arrived at Newton on the morning of that day, 
fully fifteen hours after Grierson's rear had passed. We had gained 
but six hours on him by twenty-four hours of steady riding, and it was 
evident that it would take us, at this rate, at least two days and nights 
more to come up with the column. 

When Company B was detached towards Macon, its captain was 
told by the colonel of his regiment, Edward Prince of the Seventh, 
who gave him his orders, that it was highly probable, though not cer- 



15 

tain, that Grierson, after crossing the Meridian and Jackson road 
would swing eastward into Alabama and return to the north through 
that state; and all information of his movements obtainable at Newton 
Station confirmed this belief. He had certainly gone on to Garland- 
ville, nine miles south, and it was the prevailing report that he had 
also reached ,Baldwyn and Quitman, still further south and east — the 
last a station on the Mobile and Ohio road. These facts suggested to 
Captain Forbes the very sensible plan of cutting off the southward 
loop which Grierson was believed to be making, by turning directlv 
east from Xewton, crossing the Mobile and Ohio at Enterprise, which 
he was repeatedly told was without defenders, and joining Grierson 
beyond the railroad as he passed up to the north. 

In pursuance of this plan we took the Enterprise road, and reachefl 
the outskirts of that town about i :oo o'clock. What seemed a mounted 
picket on the main road, driven in by a few shots from our advance, 
suggested that the place might indeed be occupied, and as the head of 
our little column entered one of the streets of the town it was fired on 
from a stockade about the station. Halting for a moment to consider 
his course, the captain quickly drew his saber, fastened a handkerchief 
to its point, and ordering the first file of four to follow him, he and his 
first lieutenant rode slowly down in the direction of the stockade, wav- 
ing the handkerchief as a flag of truce. The firing presently ceased, 
and three confederate officers rode out to meet them, one of whom, 
carrying a white flag at the end of an infantry ramrod, inquired. "To 
what are we indebted for the honor of this visit?" "I come from 
Major-General Grierson," answered Captam Forbes," to demand the 
surrender of Enterprise." '"Will you put the demand in writing?" 
"Certainly. To whom shall I address it?" "To Colonel Edward Gor.d- 
win, commanding the post." This was the information sought for. 
Enterprise was an occupied post. The demand was written, giving 
"one hour only for consideration, after which further delay will be at 
your peril." To the officer's question where he might be found at the 
end of the hour. Captain Forbes answered with, no doubt, unintended 
humor, that he would "fall back to the main body and there await the 
reply."* Then rejoining his company, he quietly turned his column 
to the right about and moved deliberately up the slope until out of 
sight of town, when, striking a gallop, we rode rapidly on until a safe 
distance had been reached. 

Enterprise was, in fact, unoccupied until just before we reached it, 
wdien the Thirty-fifth Alabama Infantry arrived by train from the 
south. During the hour allowed for the surrender Major General 
Loring also came jn from Meridian with the Seventh Kentucky and 
the Twelfth Louisiana,! and at the expiration of the truce these three 
regiments marched out to offer battle to the thirty-five men of Com- 
pany B. There could be no doubt that we had done our full duty, for 
that day at least, in holding the attention of the enemy to the defense 
of the Mobile and Ohio road. 



♦This account of the demand for the siiirender of Enterprise is talven from the manu- 
script of Cot. Forl>es. The writer was a witness of the transaction hut remained with 
the company. 

tSee note B, extract from the Jacltson Appeal of April 28, ISe."). 



16 

In Pemberton's report to the war department, prepared some three 
months afterwards, is the statement that General Loring, by his timely 
arrival at Enterprise from Meridian with a sufficient force of infantry, 
succeeded in saving the machinery and other valuable property at that 
town, upon which the enemy had advanced with a demand for its sur- 
render;* and Major-General Loring reports in a dispatch to Pember- 
ton. dated at Enterprise April 25:! "Enemy appeared here at 1:00 
o'clock and demanded the town. They were reported as fifteen hun- 
dred strong. Colonel Goodwin was here with the Thirty-fifth Ala- 
bama, which defied them. I hastened here with two regiments. 
Enemy fell back at least three miles. I am now on the road pursuing 
them." 

It was fortunate indeed for us that Goodwin reached Enterprise 
before we did ourselves, for we were moving then directly opposite 
to Grierson's actual line of retreat, and if we had crossed the Mobile 
and Ohio road in search of him, we should unquestionably have been 
captured or broken up. As it was, we had lost, by this attempt to 
shorten our ride, much more than we had gained the preceding day, 
and we were beginning to despair of overtaking Grierson. A consul- 
tation was quietly held among the leading officers as we rode along. 
Which way should we go? Should we try to return to Lagrange 
alone? Should we go towards Vicksburg in the hope of getting 
through to Grant, who might by this time be on our side of the river? 
Should we try our luck on a march of some hundreds of miles to Pen- 
sacola, on the Gulf, then held by federal troops? Should we even break 
up and scatter, riding north by twos and threes, in the hope that, 
though some might be taken, the rest would escape? Or would we 
return to Grierson's trail and make another effort, under new disad- 
vantages, at a direct pursuit? We stood three to one for the last 
alternative, and so we kept on for Garlandville, which we reached at 
dusk. . As we approached the town our scouts came upon a mounted 
sentinel, one of a company of sixty men just organized there, well 
armed and determined to fight if the federals came again that way. 
He was informed that we were a company of confederates from 
Mobile, ourselves in pursuit of Grierson, and he considerately rode 
on in advance, at our suggestion, to advise his comrades of that fact, 
lest they should mistake us for federals and should fire on us in the 
dusk. By this ruse we rode without disturbance through the town, 
although it contained twice our number of armed enemies. 

Following now on Grierson's trail once more, we stopped about mid- 
night for four hours' sleep on the lawn about a ])lanter's house, well 
off the main road, with only one man on guard. It was a carelessly 
fastened horse, however, which really kept watch for us. Becoming 
entangled in his halter strap, he pulled down the rail fence to which 
he was tied, with a crash which awakened the solitary sentinel, who 
had gone to sleep with his gun in his hands. 



*remberton"s final report. Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. 253. 

7 Loring to I'emberton, April 25, Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. 544. See also Buford to Pem- 
berton, April 25, p. 538. 



17 

After a rapid breakfast by the light of our camp fires we started for 
the hardest and most discouraging- ride of the raid. Approaching 
Raleigh, we repeated in substance the exploit at Thiladelphia, surpris- 
ing, by a headlong charge, a company of home guards which had 
gathered at the village inn, breaking up their guns and taking their 
captain with us as a prisoner. We were now but seven or eight hours 
behind the regiment, and hope began to dawn, when we came to a 
stream swollen with recent rains. The column had crossed on a 
bridge, which was now a wreck of blackened timbers. Grierson had 
given us up for lost and was burning his bridges behind him. Five 
times that day we swam our horses across overflowing streams, and 
once we were compelled to make a long detour to find a place where we 
could get into the water and out again. 

And then a great danger loomed ahead of us. Some thirty or 
forty miles farther on was Strong river, and a few miles beyond that 
the Pearl, neither of which we could hope to ford or swim ; and we 
were losing time, by reason of the burned bridges, instead of gaining 
on Grierson. Some way must be found to reach him before he 
destroyed Strong river bridge or we were lost ; and so the captain 
called for volunteers to ride on and overtake the column. Three of us. 
who answered the call* mounted on the best and freshest horses of 
the company, leaving our arms and all encumbrances behind except- 
ing only a pistol apiece and a few loose cartridges in our pockets, left 
the company at a gallop at about 5 :oo o'clock in the afternoon. Cap- 
tain Forbes says, in his posthumous manuscript: "I never expected 
to see one of them again, feeling sure that they would be picked off 
by .stragglers." A few miles on the way we saw a group of saddled 
horses in the brush, a little distance from the road, with no riders in 
sight. We listened for shots as we hurried by, but they did not come. 
A little after sundown the trail we were following simply stopped in 
a grassy field and went no further. Puzzled at first, we presently sus- 
pected a countermarch, and following the trail back through the thick- 
ening dusk about half a mile, we found where it branched off to the 
left. If we had been a little later we should have been completely lost. 
Black night now fell, with drizzling rain, and we dismounted now and 
then to make sure, by feeling the road, that we were still on the track 
of the regiments. And by and by we began to hear, through the trees 
faint sounds of a marching column a mile or so ahead. Pushing our 
tired horses to their best, we presently drew near Grierson's rear guard. 
"Halt! Who comes there?" some one called out to us. Ignoring the 
command, we did not slacken our speed, but answered the challenge 
as we rode by with a shout of "Company B." Instantly a great cheer 
arose, "Company B has come back." and, caught up by the rear com- 
panv, it ran down the column, cheer upon cheer, faster than our 
horses could run. Great was our welcome when we reached Grierson, 
just as his horse's hoofs were rattling on Strong river bridge, and 
repeated to him the vigorous message committed to us: "Captain 
Forbes presents his compliments, and begs to be allowed to burn his 

♦First Sergeant S. A. Forbes and Privates .Tnlin MonUlinij and .\rtluir Woods. 

— 2 GR 



i8 

bridges for himself." A detail had already been told off to burn the 
one we were on, and half an hour later we should have been too late. 

In the meantime difficulties were thickening around the march of 
the company we had left. Stopping at sunset to feed, a citizen who 
professed to know which way Grierson had gone, offered to guide 
them by a short cut through the w^oods which would save them several 
miles of travel. Whether he was blundering or treacherous they never 
certainly knew, but he led them after dark into an old tornado 
track, or windfall, as it is called ; and there, twisting and turning, this 
way and that, through the tangle of fallen tree trunks, they lost, not 
only their way, but all sense of direction likewise. Some of the men 
begged, in his hearing, to be allowed to kill the guide, and terror re- 
duced him to temporary idiocy. There was nothing to do but to 
bivouac in the rain and wait for morning to come. Every one went 
to sleep, guards and all, and when the captain awoke at dawn, their 
guide had abandoned them and their prisoners had escaped, bearing 
within them, of course, news of the company's numbers, whereabouts, 
and predicament. By a rapid scout after daylight they discovered the 
trail of the column, and once more rode steadily on in the hope that 
their messengers of the day before had not failed in their mission. 
About the middle of the afternoon of that day, April 27, the com- 
pany reached Strong river and found there a detachment of their regi- 
ment, left behind to guard the bridge and await their coming. Com- 
pany B had rejoined the main command. 

It was absent from the column five days and four nights, during 
which time it marched about three hundred miles in ten different 
counties and 'kept the attention of the enemy fixed on the defense of 
the Mobile and Ohio road. It captured and paroled forty prisoners, 
confronted and evaded several regiments of confederate troops at 
Macon and at Enterprise, slipped through the home guards of six 
county towns, was twice misled and once lost, and had five bridges 
burned in its front, and in three successive nights it had in all but six 
hours' sleep, while rations for man and horse were, for the most part, 
conspicuous by their absence. We simply had not had time to eat. 

The main body was still engaged, on April 27, in crossing Pearl 
river by means of a single small ferry boat captured in the nick of time 
by a shrewd stratagem* the night before. When Grierson stopped on the 
evening of the 26th two miles beyond Westville for about two hours' 
rest, he sent Colonel Prince with two battalions of his regiment for- 
ward to the Pearl river ferry to secure the crossing of the column by 
the only means available. Arriving before daylight. Prince found that 
the ferry boat was on the opposite side of the stream. An attempt to 
secure it by sending a man across on a powerful horse failed because 
the swollen stream was too swift to swim, but a little later the owner, 
strolling down to the river and seeing a group of horsemen on the 
bank called out to them to know if they wished to cross. In a pro- 
nounced form of the southern dialect, made more convincing by a mili- 
tary oath, Colonel Prince demanded his boat to carry over a detach- 

*Siii-l).v. p. 04. 




KDWAKD PKIXCK, 
Colonol Scvi'iilli Illinois Cavalry. Second in Conimand on tlic Grierson Kaid. 






^r-r:^lk^ 






fS 



19 

ment of the First Alabama Cavalry in pursuit of conscripts. The ferry- 
man hurried the Iwat over to our side of the stream, and the crossing 
at once began. Half an hour later a confederate courier appeared with 
orders to the ferryman to destroy his boat to prevent its falling into 
Grierson's hands.* Crossing twenty-four horses at a trip, Prince went 
with the first 200 men to seize Hazlehurst, on the New Orleans and 
Jackson road. Grierson's men, in the meantime, worked their passage 
over the Pearl, the rear guard crossing, along with Company H, about 
2 :oo p. m. of the 27th. 

It was on the afternoon of the 28th. while approaching Cnion 
Church, that Grierson first found his march resisted ; and here a dan- 
gerously complicated situation developed, from which all ])arties con- 
cerned escaped with remarkably good luck. Great destruction of roll- 
ing stock, ammunition, stores and railroad track had been wrought at 
Hazlehurst as the column passed on the preceding day,f and a bat- 
talion was sent back the next morning under Lt. Col. Trafton, of the 
Seventh, to destroy the road at Bahala a few miles further south. | 
At 2 :oo p. m. of this day Grierson was attacked at L'nion Church by 
three comj^anies of cavalry, which had come out from Xatchez under 
Captain Cleveland ;§ and Wirt Adams, making a forced march from 
Port Gibson, under Peniberton's orders of the preceding day,l| with 
four more cavalry companies and two pieces of artillery, came into the 
Natchez road that same afternoon, in Grierson's rear.^j While follow- 
ing him up after dark with a view to a night attack, Adams' own 
rear was encountered by the battalion sent to Bahala earlier in the 
day, and now marching to rejoin Grierson.** Both federal and con- 
federate, were thus cut in two, each by the other, and lioth Grier- 
son and Adams were in a sense, between two fires. Adams was in 
the greater danger, however, because either section of the federal 
column was stronger than his own command, and so he rode in the 
night past Grierson's flank and joined Cleveland in his front. 

It was no part of Grierson's plan to wait anywhere for anything — 
not even to fight — for the moment he did so his position would be- 
come a rallying point for all confederate forces, near and far. The 
next morning, consequently, after moving strongly out on the Natchez 
road to create the impression that he was a1x)ut to force his way 
through, he suddenly reversed his movement, took a labyrinthine 
course, by unfrequented roads, to the rear, and by night was below 
Brookhaven, on the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, some forty 
miles away. ft Wirt Adams, in the meantime, had fallen back before 
Grierson's advance in the morning, to Fayette, where, reinforced by 
five more companies, he awaited an attack. One can imagine the 

•Grierson's report. R. R.. 24, pt. I. p. 520. 

v(;riersoiis report. Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. r>2<J. 

"(Irierson's report. Reb. rec. 24. pt. I, p. 52G. 

iil'emborton to Bowen. April 27. R(»b. rec, 24, pt. III. p. 792. , . , 

ilWirt Adams to l'eml>erton, April 29, Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. 53,3. rieveland to oper- 
ator at Fayette. Ajuil -.iS. ]>. .".:?8. -o m 

"Grierson's report. Reb. rec, 24. pt. I, p. 52fi. Surby, pp. 78—94. 

♦♦Grierson's reijort. Rob. rec. 24, pt. I, pp. 52fi ,527. 

vtGeneral (irierson wbo is livinj; now at .Tacksonvllle. III., lately told the writer that 
he made use of a captured citizen to convey to colonel .Vdams Information of his inten- 
tion to flRht his way throiijrh to Natchox. This gentleman, temporarily detained at 
headquarters, was permitted to overhear conversations and orders, made merely to de- 
eeive him, all implyin},' a march for Xatchez the next morninf.' : and later a puard, in- 
structed to be negligent, permitted him to slip away and esiape. 



20 

chagrin with which this bold and energetic cavalry leader dispatched 
the facts to Pemberton that afternoon, expressing his intention to 
march at once to intercept Grierson on his way to Baton Rouge,* an 
intention which, indeed, he came near accomplishing, but in which he 
finally failed, owing to the start we had gained and to the extraor- 
dinary speed with which our last march was made.f 

The next day, the 30th, was a hard day, for the New Orleans and 
Jackson railroad — now the Illinois Central — which was about as badly 
wrecked from BrookhavenJ to Summit, a distance of twenty-one 
miles, as any road could well be in so short a time. § This was the 
day on which the advance of Grant's army, under McClernand, crossed 
the Mississippi to Bruinsburg for the attack on Port Gibson, made on 
the first of May. If Grierson had pressed forward on his march to- 
wards Grand Gulf, he might have joined McClernand at Port Gibson, 
then distant only thirty miles, provided that he had beaten Wirt 
Adams' ten companies of cavalry and section of artillery in his front, 
together with the reinforcements that might have come to them on the 
way. He had heard nothing from Grant, however, and had no means 
of knowing that McClernand was to come to our side of the Missis- 
sippi on the following day. 

In the meantime confusion ruled the councils of our enemies. Inter- 
ruption of communications by the destruction at Hazlehurst on the 
27th II had left Pemberton in doubt as to Grierson's course, and he 
vacillated, consequently, in his conjectures, between Grand Gulf, 
Jackson, Natchez, and Baton Rouge. On the 27th he notified Bowen, 
at Port Gibson, that Grierson might be making for Grand Gulf to fall 
on his rear ; and again that Port Gibson or Black River bridge was his 
most probable destination. ][ On the 28th he wrote Bowen again 
that he had reason to believe that Grierson was striking for Natchez or 
Baton Rouge ;** to Major Clark that the enemy might pay the con- 
federates a visit at Brookhaven ;f f to Rhodes, at Osyka, that Grierson 
was probably making for Baton Rouge or Natchez;]; J to Gardner, at 
Port Hudson, that he was probably en route for Natchez, but that 
measures should be taken to ambuscade him if he was on his way to 
Baton Rouge.§§ He gave orders to Bowen at Grand Gulf, to send 
his cavalry out to get on Grierson's flank and rear;|||| to the command- 



*Wirt Adams to Pemberton, April 29, Reb. rec, 24. pt, I, p. 533. 

tOn the niiiht of April 30, Wirt Adams was within five miles of Grierson's '.jivouac. 
(See page 22.) 

Jit fell to the writer, actinj? under orders from Col. Prince, to burn the railway 
station at Brookhaven, containing a considerable quantity of commissary stores reported 
to us to be confederate property. The flames and sparks from the station building 
greatly endangered neighboring dwellings, but these were saved and a general confla- 
gration was prevented by our own soldiers, who climbed to the roofs of the houses and 
kept them wet by pouring water ovei* them until the Are had burned down. 

§Grierson's report. Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p^ 527. 

II Pemberton to Bowen, April 28, Reb. rec, 24, pt. Ill, p. 797. 

IJPemberton to Bowen, April 27. Reb. rec, 24, pt. Ill, p. 792. 

♦♦Pemberton to Bowen. April 28, R. R., 24, pt. Ill, p. 797. 

ttPemberton to Clark, April 28, Reb. rec, 24, pt. III. p. 798. 

t+Pemberton to Rhodes. April 28, Reb. rec, 24, pt. Ill, p. 799. 

§§Pemberton to Gardner, April 28, Reb. rec, 24, pt. Ill, p. 798. 

II II Pemberton to Bowen, April 27, R. R., 24, pt. Ill, p. 792, Pemberton to Stevenson, 
April 27, Reb. rec, 24, pt. ITT, p. 794. 



21 



ing officers at Brookhaven,* llazleluirst,t and Osvkaf to send their 
troops as rapidly as possible towards Grand Gulf; to Capt. William 
Wren, at Monticello, to learn the position of the enemy and to ambus- 
cade and annoy him, particularly in his camp at night (R. R. Ft. Ill ; 
P- 793) J to Colonel Russel, at Jackson, to have his three mounted com- 
panies ready to move, with five days' rations, at 9 :oo p. m. ; to Colonel 
Reynolds,§ to Colonel Farrell,|| at Lake Station, to General Loring^ 
at Meridian, and to General Tilghman** to bring their commands to 
Jackson; and to Ruggles at Columbus, ft to be on the watch for fed- 
eral forces coming south — although he had ordered Barteau, the pre- 
ceding day, to come down from northeast Mississippi to Ilazlehurst, 
on the New Orleans and Jackson road.lt Wholly uncertain as to 
Grierson's objective point, he thus tried to guard all points at once, 
as well as he could with his small and scattered forces ; and reiterated 
to his cavalry commanders the orders to get on the flank and rear of 
the federal column, in the evident hope of so delaying its march as 
to enable him to concentrate against it a superior force. §§ All was in 
vain, however, and the flying column sped on its way untouched, and 
almost unseen, by its swarming enemies. 

And now we approach the second crisis of the raid, the event of 
which was to show whether or not its brilliant success had been won at 
a cost of the loss of the raiding force. It was the first day of May. 
Six days before, and three times thereafter, Gardner, at Port Hudson, 
had been warned by Pemberton to prepare to capture Grierson if he 
should attempt to go through to Baton Rouge. |||| The focus of danger 
was Williams' bridge^^ across the Amite river, directly east of Port 
Hudson, and only some thirty miles from Gardner's army. If this 
bridge, over an unfordable stream which must be crossed to reach 
Baton Rouge, were either destroyed or held, the hunt was up and the 
raiders would probably be bagged; and when, at Summit, on the 30th, 
Grierson finally decided to make the dash for Baton Rouge,*** he was 
even then more than twice as far from the Amite river bridge as was 
Gardner at Port Hudson. 

The southern part of the State was now swarming with cavalry 
troops — sent northeast from Port Hudson.ftt sent south by rail from 
Jackson and Meridan.Ht coming north from Ponchatoula, §§§ and 
speeding diagonally down from Natchez and Port Gibson. || || 1| As early 



•remberton to Clark. April 2S. Rcb. rpc, 24. pt. III. p. TOS. _ 

tPemberton to Commanfllnc: Officer of Cavalry. April 2S. Reb. rec, 24, pt. HI. p .08. 

tTaylor to Russell. April 28. Reb. rec. 24, pt. III. p. 700. 

SPemberton to Reynolds, April 28. Reb. rec. 24. pf. III. P- "90. 

nPemherton to Farrell. April 28. Reb. rec. 24. pt. III. p. ^08. 

*IPemborton to Lorinpr. April 28. Reb. rec, 24. pt. HI. p .08 

♦•Pemberton to TilRhman. April 28. Reb. rec 24. pl.^IH. P„^I)0- 

ttPemberton to RuRsles. April 28. Reb. rec. 24 pt. III. p. .00 

JtPemherton to Reynolds. April 27. Reb. rec. 24. pt. III. p. -04. „„„„„ 

HPemherton-s orders to Bowen. Clark, commandinsr officer cavalry. Porter. Powell 

^i;,F?;r:t.4^;!; ^r^. !M^Hl'^4.'^U'Ve^^ri;r?ll. p. 78=. April 25. pt. HI. p. 

H.Or«:?-I'r^eio^"R'lb.Tec.«t:^I.''k"27.'V?aria^ to Wll.son. Mav 1. pt. T. 

p. f'4.3. „. , ^ _„_ 

•••Orierson's report. Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. o-i. 
tttDeBann to Wilson. May 6. Reb. rec. 24. pt I. p. 539 
tttRlchardson to Peml>erton. May X reb. rec. 24. pt I. P- ^47. 
SHSimonton to Wlllson. April 30. Reb rec. 24. pt. I n. 5.v3 
II II II Wirt Adams to Pemberton, May 5. Reb. rec. 24. pt. I. p. o.i.i. 



22 

as the 28th, before Grierson had reached Union Church, eleven compan- 
ies were operating along the New Orleans and Jackson Road above 
Osyka.* A legion of infantry, with artillery, left Port Hudson on 
the 29th, the day Grierson passed Brookhaven, but committed the error 
of moving northeast to Clinton, and thence still northeast to Osyka. 
which it reached on the first day of May,f after Grierson had passed.^ 

Richardson, coming down from the north by rail with 470 men, and 
leaving the cars at Hazlehurst on the 29th followed Grierson's trail 
to Union Church, and back again to Brookhaven, and then, riding all 
night, planned an attack on Grierson at Summit for the morning of 
May I, but, entering this place at 3:00 a. m., he found himself nine 
hours too late. Thence he rode on — past Grierson's flank as he sup- 
posed, to get in his front — and formed an ambuscade at sunrise in the 
woods by the side of the road, between Summit and Magnolia, only to 
learn at 9 :oo o'clock that his enemy had spent the night a dozen miles 
to the west.§ Wirt Adams, in the meantime, leaving Fayette on the 
afternoon of the 28th and following on our trail, had camped on this 
same night of the 30th, ten miles from Summit, on the Libert}- road 
— evidently about five miles from Grierson's own camp. He is said 
to have sent Lieutenant Wren forward with orders to burn Williams' 
bridge across the Amite, ]| with the intention of following on himself 
the next day to cut the federal column at that point. 

Only two of all these swarming cavalry commands suceeded in 
reaching Grierson's line of march in advance of Grierson himself. To 
Major J. DeBaun, of the Ninth Louisiana Partisan Rangers (Wing- 
field's battalion) belongs the honor of having planted himself in 
the way of the advancing column and made a bold attempt to delav its 
march. Leaving Port Hudson April 28, under orders from General 
Gardner,^ he went at first north to Woodville, and being then ordered 
east to Osyka, he started for that point on .the morning of the 30th, and 
reach a bridge over the Tickfaw river, locally known as Wall's 
bridge, about eight miles from his place of destination, at 11:30 a. 
m. of May the first.** While he was halting to rest his men and 
horses, Grierson's column, which had struck the road behind him at 
about 10:00 o'clock, came upon his rear guard at this bridge.ff Some 
firing upon foragers from his command warned him of Grierson's ap- 
proach, and gave him time to place his 115 men in ambush in the woods 
beyond the bridge. While a squad of our scouts, dressed in citizen's 
clothing and riding some distance in advance, were beguiling and cap- 
turing De Baun's rear guard, by whom they were supposed to be con- 
federates, Lieutenant-Colonel Blackburn, of the Seventh Illinois, im- 
patient of delay, came galloping down alone, and ordering the scouts 

*Pe(mberton to Bowen. April 28, Reb. rec, 24. pt. III. p. 797^ 

tMiles" legion reached the Tickfaw river at Wall's bridge, five hours after Grierson 
had gone on. A wounded Federal soldier, who saw it pass his window, estimated its 
strength at three hundred cavalry, two thousand infantry, and a battery of artillery. 
(Surby, p. 153.) 

JGardner to Pemberton, April 28, Reb. rec, pt. I. p. 542. Miles to Willson, May 5, 
pt. I. p. 545. Willson to Gardner, Special Orders. No. 121, April 29, pt, III, p. 805'. 

§ Richardson to Pemberton, May 3, Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p 548. 

II Richardson to Pemberton, Mav 3, Reb. rec, 24, pt. I. p. 549. 

TlWillson, Special Orders, No. 120, April 28, Reb. rec, 24, pt. III, p. SOiO. 

**De Baun to Willson, Mav 6. Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p 539 

ttSurby, p. 104, fif. ' 



23 

to follow him, dashed upon the bridge. This drew the fire of the se- 
creted party, not more than fifty yards away. The colonel fell mortally 
wounded, and the leader of the scouts was shot through the thigh. 
Grierson's advance guard of a dozen men also charged across the 
bridge, but were driven back by a volley, leaving one killed and two 
wounded behind them. Two of Grierson's companies were thereupon 
dismounted, two cannon were brought up, and DelJaun's force was 
soon dislodged, and sent flying to Osyka, which place it reached at 5 :oo 
p. m. The federal loss at this, the most important skirmish of the raid, 
was one man killed and five men wounded — two of them mortally — and 
three men left as volunteer prisoners, to care for their wounded com- 
rades.* De Baun's own loss was a captain, lieutenant, and six men, 
all taken prisoners.! 

Half a dozen miles farther down, a company of Mississippi cavalry 
which was about to enter the road in front of the column was at- 
tacked by our advance and presently driven ofF.+ Major W. H. Gar- 
land, who was in charge of this party, makes the surprising statement, 
in his report of the skirmish, that he lost about seventy men, and that 
his horses were "all broke down."§ These losses must have occurred 
after the fighting was over. 

In this exciting and somewhat ominous manner the long last ride 
began. When we started that morning at early dawn from our bivouac 
between Summit and Liberty, we were seventy-six miles from Baton 
Rouge, II and it was not in any one's mind that we should halt for 
either food or rest before a place of safety had been reached. Even a 
little fight may mean a long delay, and delays just then were peculiarly 
dangerous. x-\nd so, with the speed of the horses set at the highest 
pace which they were likely to be able to keep to the end, we forged 
ahead, not so much to defeat as merely to outride our enemies. .-Xnd 
still we had to pass the Amite river bridge, which might be held by a 
superior force, for all that we knew, or it might already be burned. 
From our right, as we approached it, there came to our ears from time 
to time, through the moonless night, the dull boom of a big gun. giving 
us the direction of Port Hudson, then being bombarded by the federal 
mortar-boats. We knew that there had lately been a picket at the 
Amite bridge, with its headquarters at a plantation half a mile away. 
Was this picket post still there, and would they learn of our 'approach 
and set fire to the bridge? About 12:00 o'clock we were in its im- 
mediate neighborhood .and the advance dashed down. A single horse- 
man was moving quietly southward from the bridge towards the lights 
of the premises said to be the headquarters of the guard. They had 
not even suspected our approach; and in a few minutes, just as the 
moon rose to light us on our way, the muffled thunder of our horses' 
feet resounded from its entire length. 



•Grierson's report, Rob. rec, '24. pt. I, p. .".lii. ^"'•l>.y. P- 11-. 

tDeBaun to Willson, May 6, Keh. rec, :;4, pt. I, p. 540. 

JDeBaun to Willson, May 6, Keb. rec. 1^4. pt. I, p. ."hJO Surby. p. 114. 

SGarland to Willson, May 1, Keb. rec. L'4, pt. I. p. o4.<. 

IIGrierson's report, Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. 528. 



24 

We were over the Amite, and the worst crisis of the raid was past. 
All the more heavily, as the excitement of danger died away, there 
settled down on the hearts of the raiders the overwhelming sense of 
hunger and fatigue. There were still some thirty miles to ride before 
we might halt to eat and rest, and I am sure that no one who rode them 
will ever forget that night. It was the painful duty of the rear guard 
of the column not only to keep alert themselves but also to keep the 
men from straggling. The captain of that company says : "Men by the 
score, and I think by fifties, were riding sound asleep in their saddles. 
The horses excessively tired and hungry, would stray out of the road 
and thrust their noses to the earth in hopes of finding something to 
eat. The men, when addressed, would remain silent and motionless 
until a blow across the thigh or the shoulder should awaken them, when 
it would be found that each supposed himself still riding with his com- 
pany, which might perhaps be a mile ahead. We found several men 
who had either fallen from their horses, or dismounted and dropped 
on the ground, dead with sleep. Nothing short of a beating with the 
flat of a saber would awaken some of them. In several instances they 
begged to be allowed to sleep, saying that they would run all risk of 
capture on the morrow. Two or three did escape our vigilance, and 
were captured the next afternoon.* 

While the rear of the column was thus drifting along through the 
night, more than half asleep, the advance, probably two miles in the 
lead, had its welcome aids to wakefulness in the complete surprise and 
capture of two confederate camps, each with about forty men — one at 
the crossing of the Big Sandy, and the other at a ford of the Comite, 
only a few miles out from our destination. f 

Between 8:00 and 9:00 o'clock we were met by a cavalry company 
scouting out from Baton Rouge to learn the meaning of a rumor which 
had reached their camp that an important force was nearing the city. 
They knew nothing whatever of the raid, and were slow to believe our 
tale, as was also General Augur, then in command of the post. It was 
not until we had been in bivouac three hours, and after Grierson had 
visited post headquarters, that we were admitted to the federal lines 
and to the protection of the flag. As we rode at last through Baton 
Rouge, the streets were banked for a mile or more on either side with 
cheering crowds of citizens of the town and the soldiers of Augur's 
army, and the wayworn but triumphant column was brought to bivouac 
in a beautiful magnolia grove to the south of the city. It was pathetic- 
ally significant of the stress and strain of the long hard ride, particu- 
larly on those responsible in any way for its successful issue, that the 
hero of the Enterprise episode, the captain of Company B of the Sev- 
enth, went suddenly delirious the next morning, as he lay resting by 
his camp fire, and was taken with cautious violence to the post hospital, 
tearing the curtains from the ambulance on the way, and swearing that 
we might kill him if we would but we could never take him prisoner. 

And now the raid thus briefly described, it only remains for me to 
quote, from official reports, federal and confederate, a few comments 

*MSS. of Col. H. C. Forbes. 

tGrierson's report, Reb. rec, 24, pt. J, pp. 527, 528. Bryan to Miles, May 10, Reb. 
rec, 24, pt. I, p. 537. 



'25 

on its methods and on some of its more jreneral results. Colonel Wirt 
Adams, who, it will be remembered, was left in the lureh by (Jrierson, 
at Fayette, April 29. wrote to Pembcrton May 5:* "I pursued the 
cavalry to a point near Greensburg-, in Louisiana, near which they 
forded the Amite river and made good their escape to Baton Rouge. 
Notwithstanding I marched over fifty miles per day, and moved during 
day and night, yet owing to the distance I had to traverse from west 
to east to reach the line of their march, and to their use of the most 
skillful guides and unfrequented roads, I found it impossible, to my 
great mortification and regret, to overhaul them. During the last 
twenty-four hours of their march in this state they traveled at a sweep- 
ing gallop, the numerous stolen horses previously collected furnishing 
them relays." Lieutenant-Colonel Gannt, who also failed in the pur- 
suit, writes. May 4.f "The enemy managed so as to completely deceive 
the citizens and our scouts as to his purposes, and, by a march of al- 
most unprecedented rapidity, moved off by the Greensburg road to 
Baton Rouge." Colonel E. \\ Richardson, another failure in pursuit, 
says. May 3:^ "He has made a most successful raid through the 
length of the state of Mississippi and a i)art of Louisiana, one which 
will exhilarate for a short time the fainting spirits of the northern 
war party;" and General Pemberton says in his final report :§ "The 
enemy * * * succeeded in destroying several miles of the track 
of the Southern Railroad west of Chunkey river, which, for more than 
a week, greatly delayed the transportation of troops, and entirely pre- 
vented that of supplies ( except by wagons) from our depots on the 
Mobile and Ohio Railroad." 

Grierson himself says of the said:|| "During the expedition we 
killed and wounded about 100 of the enemy, captured and paroled over 
500 prisoners, many of them officers, destroyed between 50 and 60 
miles of railroad and telegraph, captured and destroyed over 3.000 
stand of arms, and other army stores and government property to an 
immense amount; and also captured 1,000 horses and mules. * * * 
We marched over six hundred miles in less than sixteen days. The 
last twenty-eight hours we marched seventy-six miles, had four en- 
gagements with the enemy, and forded the Comite river, which was 
deep enough to swim many of the horses. During this time the men 
and horses were without food or rest." 

General Grant says. May 3 :^ "Colonel Grierson's raid frt)m La- 
grange through Mississippi has been the most successful thing of the 
kind since the breaking out of the Rebellion. * * * * jhe south- 
ern papers and southern people regard it as one of the most daring ex- 
ploits of the war. T am told the whole state is filled with jnen j)aroled 
by Grierson." And again, May 6:** "He has spread excitement 



*.\f1ams to Pemberton. Mav .'">. RH>. ro<\. 24, pt. I. p. 5.1.1. 
vGannt to Willson, Mnv 4. Uoh. roc. 24, pt, I, p. .")40. 
JRichardson to PemlM'rton, May 1. Kob. rcc. 24. pt. I. p. 550. 
SPemborton's report. Heb. rec, 24. pt. I, p. 25.1. 
jIGrierson's report. Heb. rec. 24, pt. I. p. 52S. 
lIGrant to Halleck. Mav '.i. ReK rec. 24 pt. I. p. .1.1. 
•♦Grant to Halleck, Mav 0, Reb. rec. 24. pt. I, p. .14. 



2b 

throughout the state, destroying railroads, trestleworks, bridges, burn- 
ing locomotives and railway stock, taking prisoners, and destroying 
stores of all kinds. To use the expression of my informant 'Grierson 
has knocked the heart out of the state.' " And finally, July 6, in his 
report to the War Department on the Vicksburg campaign, he 
writes :* "In accordance with previous instructions, Major-General 
S. A. Hurlbut started Colonel (now Brigadier-General) B. H. Grier- 
son with a cavalry force from Lagrange, Tennessee, to make a raid 
through the central portion of the state of Mississippi, to destroy rail- 
roads and other public property, for the purpose of creating a diversion 
in favor of the army moving to the attack on Vicksburg. * * * 
This expedition was skillfully conducted, and reflects great credit on 
Colonel Grierson and all of his command. The notice given this raid 
by the southern press confirms our estimate of its importance. It has 
been one of the most brilliant cavalry exploits of the war, and will be 
handed down in history as an example to be imitated." 

Long may it be before it falls to an American soldier to imitate this 
feat of war ; but it seems to fall particularly to this society to hand it 
down to history. 



Appendix. 

NOTE A. 

Inception of Plans and Preliminary Orjdcrs for the Raid. — Various 
plans for a raid similar to the one finally decided on were suggested in 
February and March, 1863, after the withdrawal of Van Dorn's com- 
mand from Northern Mississippi, late in January, left the confederate 
railroads of that part of the state comparatively unprotected. The first 
recorded mention of an expedition of this kind was made to General 
Hurlbut by General C. S. Hamilton, writing at Memphis February 12: 
"It is the time to strike the Vicksburg and Jackson road. I would 
recommend that a brigade of cavalry move from Lagrange around the 
headwaters of the Tallahatchie and Yalabusha, making as much of 
a demonstration as possible about Pontotoc ; then the main body to re- 
tire, and a single regiment, under a dashing leader — say, Hatch — move 
to the south as rapidly as possible, taking fresh horses from the coun- 
try, and push night and day direct for Jackson. * * * * "iphe 
bridge over the Pearl river could be destroyed, as well as all the rail- 
road shops and rolling stock, and a dash made at the Big Black river 
bridge, which, if destroyed, will completely isolate Vicksburg from the 
interior. After getting round the headwaters of the Yalabusha, the 
route should be as nearlv as possible along the line of the Mississippi 
Central Road." (R. R.,'Ser. I., Vol. 24, Pt. III., p. 45.) 

A similar idea had occurred to General Grant, who wrote to Hurlbut 
from Lake Providence, La., February 13: "It seems to me that Grier- 



"Grant to Kelton, .Tiily 6, Reb. rec, 24, pt. I, p. 58. 



2f 

son, with alxDut 5(X3 picked men, niip^ht succeed in makinc^ his way 
south and cut the railroad cast of Jackson, Miss. Hie undertaking 
would be a hazardous one, but it would pay well if carried out. I do 
not direct that this shall be done, but leave it for a volunteer enter- 
prise." (R. R., Ser. I., Vol. 24, Pt. III., p. 50.) 

Hamilton's proposal was followed up by Hurlbut in a letter to Raw- 
lins (Grant's adjutant-general) written February 16, evidently before 
he had received Grant's own letter of three days earlier date. After 
reporting \'an Dorn's withdrawal from his front with four brigades 
of cavalry and two batteries, he continues : "As I am satisfied this will 
remove all cavalry from our front, at the suggestion oi (icncral 
Hamilton, I have ordered Grierson's brigade to cross the headwaters 
of the Tallahatchie to the Yalabusha, by way of Pontotoc, cut the wires, 
destroy bridges and demonstrate in that neighborhood, while the Second 
Iowa Cavalry. Colonel Hatch, pushes night and day toward the main 
road between Meridian and \'icksburg. if possible to destroy the 
bridge across Pearl river, in rear of Jackson, and do as much damage 
as possible on that line, returning by the best course they can make. It 
appears perilous, but I think it can be done and done with safety, and 
may relieve vou somewhat at Vicksburg." ( R. R.. Ser. I., \^ol. 24, 
Pt. III., p. 58.) 

In consequence of information received, February 20, of the pres- 
ence of considerable bodies of confederate troops in central Mississippi, 
Hamilton suspended this movement, and Hurlbut, acquiescing, so re- 
ported to Grant. (R. R., Ser. I., Vol. 24, Pt. III., 'pp. 62 and 63.) 
March 9. General Grant expressed a qualified disapproval of this post- 
ponement, saying, "I regret that the expedition you had fitted out was 
not permitted to go. The weather, however, has been so intolerably 
bad ever since that it might have failed." In the same connection he 
described a plan of his own for a raid to start from Lagrange, under 
Grierson — "as being much better qualified to command this expedition 
than either Lee or Mizner" — to cut the railroad east of Jackson, af- 
terward reioining a still larger force which should operate in the mean- 
time against the Mobile and Ohio road. ( R. R.. I., 24. Pt. III., p. 95.) 

A somewhat similar scheme had meanwhile been discussed by the 
two officers most concerned in its execution. General William Sooy 
Smith, commander, at the time, of the First Division of Hurlbut's Six- 
teenth Army Corps, and Colonel B. H. Grierson in command of the 
First Cavalrv Brigade, both these officers having their headquarters at 
Lagrange. Smith's plan, although directed to the same end as the 
others. "difi:ered from them especially in the fact that he wished the 
raiding column, after destroying the railroad east of Vicksburg. to 
avoid the confederate forces certain to concentrate against its return 
to Lagrange bv pushing south to Baton Rouge : and (iricrson agreed 
with Smith that this seemingly bolder course would be much the less 
hazardous. At a protracted conference "lasting until after midnight" 
held by them with Hurlbut. at Memphis, some time during the latter 
part of March.* they failed to convince Hurlbut of the superior ad- 

*Smith says "'about threo woeks." before the rwelpt of Ilnrlbiit's formal orders, 
issued April 10. 



28. 

vantage of their plan, and his orders to Smith of April lo specific- 
ally directed a return through northern Alabama. Confidently be- 
lieving that Hurlbut's judgment was in error, Smith assumed the grave 
responsibility of personally ordering Grierson to go through to Baton 
Rouge, advising him at the same time that as soon as his connections 
were broken he was free to use his own discretion in meeting emergen- 
cies as they might arise, and that, after effecting his main purpose, 
he should go south or return to the north, as he might judge to be 
the most expedient. A letter from General Smith to the writer, dated 
May 4, 1907, upon which especially this statement is based, is as fol- 
lows : 

"Hulbut's order to me April 10, his letter to Rawlins, and his final 
order to me April 16, specifically or by fair inference directed Grierson 
to return by way of north Alabama, and his orders were so understood 
by him and me. Grierson's brigade was part of my command guard- 
ing the Memphis and Charleston and other railroad lines, and repairing 
them whenever they were injured by the enemy holding the south bank 
of the Tallahatchie river, running east and west nearly parallel with 
the Memphis and Charleston road about forty miles further south. 

"The rebel raiders, Forrest and Chalmers, made frequent forays, 
striking the railroad between the points garrisoned by our troops, tear- 
ing it up and then retreating beyond the Tallahatchie before they could 
be overtaken by our cavalry sent in pursuit. I determined, if I could 
get the consent of my superior officers, to turn the tables on them by 
sending our cavalry to the rear of their army and raiding their lines 
of communication, letting them have the fun of doing the chasing. 

"Having talked the matter over with Grierson, who strongly ap- 
proved the idea, we went to Memphis and discussed it with General 
Hurlbut during a long conversation at which Grierson was present. 
Hurlbut disapproved of the movement through to Baton Rouge, as too 
rash and hazardous. I urged it strenuously on the ground that it was 
far less dangerous to go on through than to attempt to return ; which 
would bring him right into the hands of Forrest's and Chalmers' com- 
bined forces pursuing him. Grierson agreed with me and expressed 
full confidence in his ability to go through to Baton Rouge as we had 
planned. 

"Plurlbut could not be convinced, and about three weeks later sent 
me the final orders referred to by you. [Order of April 10.] When 
I showed these orders to Grierson we were sorely puzzled, feeh'ng 
that the raid as we had planned it promised almost certain success, 
and that it would spread consternation throughout the rebel territory, 
while any attempt to return by way of north Alabama would almost 
certainly end in disastrous failure. 

'T finally said to Grierson that Hulbut's order was directed to me 
and that he was not supposed to know what it was, that he would go 
in obedience to the orders I should give him, and that I would take the 
responsibility and order him to go straight through to our army at 
Baton Rouge. If he succeeded, no questions would be asked ; and if 
he failed, I would take the consequences and should probably be cash- 
iered for disobedience of orders. 



29 

"At all events, when he had passed to the rear of the enemy's lines 
south of the Tallahatchie his communications with us would be cut off, 
and he would have discretionary power, and it would be his duty and 
privilege to use his own best judgment as to the course it would be 
safest and best to take. Most likely, after the rebel cavalry had closed 
in behind him, he would not dare to try to get back, and would have 
to go right straight on to Baton Rouge. 

"This was my final order to him, and I know of no other that was 
given to him by any one before his departure. He went south around 
the eastern end of the enemy's line, while I moved a brigade of in- 
fantry on Panola at the western end of it. making a strong diversion in 
his favor. He easily overcame all opposition made by the enemy and 
reached his destination without serious loss, having destroyed army 
stores and torn up railroads on his way, captured prisoners, and given 
the rebels a thorough and wide-spread shaking up. No more brilliant 
or effective raid was made by the troops of either army during the war 
of the rebellion. 

"Grierson was an ideal cavalry officer — brave and dashing, cunning 
and resourceful — and his troops were excellent and well worthy of 
such a commander. The conception and general plan of the raid were 
mine. Its masterly execution belonged to Grierson and to his able 
and gallant subordinate officers and brave men, and to them and him 
I have always gladly given the praise they deserved." 

NOTE B. 

Local Effects of the Raid. — It was the sole object of the Grierson 
raid to break up railroads and to destroy transportation facilities and 
public property of the confederacy, and every effort was made by the 
leading officers to prevent interference with the persons and property 
of citizens, except as necessary to the safety of the command and the 
success of the expedition. General Grant in his order to Hurlbut of 
March 9 (R. R., 24. Pt. III., p. 95) says specifically, "The troops should 
be instructed to keep well together, and let marauding alone for once, 
and thereby better secure success." Grierson says in his report (R. R., 
24, Pt. I., p. 524) : "We arrived at Louisville soon after dark. I sent 
a battalion of the Sixth Illinois, under Major Starr, in advance, to 
picket the town and remain until the column had passed, when they 
were relieved by a battalion of the Seventh Illinois, under Major Gra- 
ham, who was ordered to remain until we should have been gone an 
hour, to prevent persons leaving with information of the course we 
were taking, to drive out stragglers, preserve order, and quiet the 
fears of the people. They had heard of our coming a short time before 
we arrived, and many had left, taking only what they could hur- 
riedly move. The column moved quietly through the town without 
halting, and not a thing was disturbed. Those who remained at home 
acknowledged that they were surprised. They had expected to be 
robbed, outraged and have their houses burned. On the contrary, they 
were protected in their persons and property." And in describing a 
skirmish with a company at Garlandville (page 525) he says: "After 



30 

disarming them, we showed them the folly of their actions, and released 
them. Without any exception they acknowledged their mistake, and 
declared that they had been grossly deceived as to our real character. 
One volunteered his services as guide, and upon leaving us declared 
that hereafter his prayers should be for the Union army. I mention 
this as a sample of the feeling which exists, and the good effect which 
our presence produced among the people in the country through which 
we passed." Nevertheless, the exigencies of the service demanded 
many acts on our part of a kind to cause wide-spread apprehension, 
and to leave behind us a broad trail of consternation and dismay. It 
was unavoidable that we should be obliged, after the first few days, 
to "live upon the country," with all that is implied by this expression ; 
that as our horses gave out we should continue our march by seizing 
others in their place ; and that negroes should be permitted to avail 
themselves of our presence to escape from bondage — facts which gave 
to the movement of Grierson's column through the length of the state 
the character of a great public calamity. Illustrations of the impres- 
sion made by our movement are contained in the following extracts 
from the manuscript of Colonel Forbes, and from the southern news- 
papers of the time. 

From the MS. of Col. H. C. Forbes. — We had not been long on our 
road [Starkville to Macon] before we were made aware of the ludi- 
crous but tremendous panic which the raid was causing in these parts. 
As fast as men could ride and negroes run, the most exaggerated re- 
ports flew right and left, both as to the numbers and the conduct of our 
soldiers. Our hundreds became so many thousands, while our really 
restrained and considerate bearing towards the people was transmuted 
into every form of plunder and violence. The whole region was terror- 
ized. The conscription had largely stripped the country of its natural 
defenders, yet there was a considerable coritingent of white men to be 
found about the plantations. There were also many skulkers from the 
conscription and deserters from the confederate armies who were much 
more willing to shoot than to be shot. In every county and in most 
towns there were organizations of home guards, primarily raised to 
overawe the blacks and to keep in check the reckless elements of the 
population. 

The women, the children, and the superannuated men completed the 
list. This heterogeneous and not wholly normal populace was thrown 
into the wildest excitement as we sped through. Some wished to 
fight ; many chose to run ; and all busied themselves with attempts to 
secrete their property. The flour and sugar were thrust into the re- 
motest corner of the garret ; the ham and bacon were buried under the 
houses or in the ash-heaps ; the silver and china services were secreted 
under the soil of the freshly hoed gardens ; the negro men were sent 
away into the swamps with the stock of all kinds, and oftentimes with 
wagon-loads of household stuff. The white men, unless bearing arms, 
were generally secreted from what was commonly supposed to be 
probable capture and possible murder, in whatever best hiding-place 
could be devised ; while the women and children held the home against 
the invader — and well indeed they did it. I never saw a southern 
woman show undignified fear in her own home. They had the prej- 



31 

udices of their section and the expressiveness of their sex, and always 
a full hroadside of both for the adventurous Yankee who lingered long 
enough to afTord a fair mark. ****** 

As, therefore, wc moved towards Macon, vvc found ourselves in the 
midst of the left-hand crest of this panic-stricken overflow from the 
main march ; a stampede which, as we afterwards learned, extended 
twenty to thirty miles in each direction. 

From the Paitliiig {Mississif'pi) "Clarion" of May /. i86j. — On 
last Friday morning a force of federal cavalry. supix)sed to be from 
twelve to fifteen hundred in number, with four pieces of light artillery, 
suddenly made their appearance at Xewton Station, on the Southern 
railroad. They entered Philadelphia. Xeshoba county, late Thursday 
evening, and early the ne.xt morning were at Xewton, thirty-seven 
miles distant. 

From all we can learn, this Ixxly of federals passed from North 
Mississippi through the counties of Pontotoc. Chickasaw, and Oktib- 
beha, and through Philadelphia and Decatur to the Southern road. 

.\fter leaving Newton Station, the federals proceeded to Garland- 
ville, in Jasper county. This neighborhood being one of the richest in 
this part of the state, suffered severely from their depredations. As 
they approached Garlandville, three shots were fired at them, resulting 
in the killing of one of their horses and severely wounding one of the 
men. who was the next day left behind in Smith county. The parties 
who fired at them (Cole, ]\Iarshal, Levi and Chapman) escaped. From 
Garlandville they proceeded in the direction of Raleigh, and camped 
Friday night at Mr. C. M. Bender's, thirteen miles from Garlandville. 
They took all Mr. Bender's mules and two of his negroes, and con- 
sumed a large amount of his corn and meat. Before leaving Mr. B.'s 
they gave him a receipt for three thousand rations of meat and forage, 
signed by \Xm. Prince, Colonel, Seventh Illinois cavalry, commanding 
second brigade, etc. From here they went to the residence of Elias 
Nichols, in Smith county, robbed him of all his mules, a carriage, sev- 
eral of his negroes, and a greater part of his corn and meat. They 
passed on from X^ichols' to Raleigh. 

A company of about fifty men. armed with double-barrel guns, were 
made up at Paulding on Saturday to defend the place ; but hearing 
during the day that the federals had passed rapidly into Smith county, 
concluded it was useless to pursue them. But on Sunday news that a 
Ixjdy of the enemy [Company B, Seventh Illinois] had again appeared 
at Garlandville. caused them to reassemble, and on Sunda}- niglit a 
good company left this place in their pursuit. On Monday morning 
they heard in Smith that they had left that county the day before, and 
there being no probability of overtaking them, they returned home. 

A meeting of citizens of Jasper county, not subject to conscription, 
will be held in Paulding on next Monday, for the purpose of organiz- 
ing a volunteer company of cavalry for home defense. 

From the Jackson "Appeal" for April 28, 186^. — From various 
sources we have particulars of the enemy's movements from the north 
line of Mississippi, through tlie eastern portion of the State, almost to 



32 

the Louisiana line. The route chosen for this daring dash was through 
the Hne of counties lying between the Mobile and Ohio, and New Or- 
leans, Jackson and Great Northern Railroads, in which, as they antici- 
pated, there was no organized force to oppose them. 

The penetration of an enemy's country, however, so extensively, 
will be recorded as one of the gallant feats of the war, no matter 
whether the actors escape or are captured. The expedition, we learn, 
was under command of Col. Grierson, of Illinois, who has already 
acquired considerable reputation as a dashing leader in west Tennes- 
see. He boasted that he had no fears of his ability to extricate his 
command from the dangerous position it seemed to be in, but gave no 
indication as to the route he should take to get out of the country. 
* * * After crossing Leaf river, the bridges behind them were 
burned. Last night, it appears to be authentically reported, they 
camped near Westville, in the southern part of Simpson county. 
Whether they will move thence to Natchez, via Monticello and Holmes- 
ville, can only be conjectured; but we still incline to the opinion so con- 
fidently expressed some days ago, on first being advised of their pres- 
ence at Newton, that Baton Rouge will be their haven, if undisturbed. 
The crossing of Pearl river is the only natural difficulty they will en- 
counter, and as we have no doubt they are advised as to the facilities 
they can secure at the different prominent fords, we presume they will 
act accordingly. Monticello and Holmesville may expect a visit. 

The damage to the Southern railroad extends over a distance of four 
and a half miles, commencing a mile west of Newton, and running 
east. Two bridges, each about 150 feet long, seven culverts and one 
cattle cap, constitute the injury done. * * * Twenty freight cars 
were burned at Newton, and the depot buildings and two commissary 
buildings. The telegraph wire was taken down for miles, and cut in 
pieces. In many instances the wire was rolled up and put into the 
ditches and pools. But few poles were destroyed. We can hear of but 
little outrage having been committed upon the persons of non-combat- 
ants or upon their property, except by the seizure of every good horse, 
and of the necessary forage and provisions. They had to depend upon 
the country for these. * * * The safe at the railroad depot was 
broken open and the funds abstracted. The money was returned, 
however, by their commanding officer, with the exception of fifteen 
hundred dollars that, it was claimed, some of the men had stolen. The 
main body of the party in the movement upon Enterprise was halted at 
Hodge's residence, about five miles out, where they remained several 
hours.' A detachment was sent to take the place [Company B, 7th 
Illinois], and they advanced with the greatest confidence. Fortunately, 
the Thirty-fifth Alabama, under Lieutenant-Colonel Goodman, arrived 
about the same time and met the advancing party as they were 
approaching the bridge. As our men were about to open fire a flag 
of truce was raised, when a parley ensued and a demand for a surren- 
der was made. Colonel G. was expecting reinforcements every moment 
and asked time to consider. The Yankees then fell back and, Colonel 
Loring arriving with the Twelfth Louisiana, Colonel Scott, and the 
Seventh Kentucky, Major Bell, pursuit was commenced, when it was 



a 

toun.l Ihr adyaiKV had tallni hark t<. iho main h.xly an-l all had j^oiic. 
A fruitless crtoit to come iij) with thorn was made some miles further, 
hut tiu'v hail evitlently hecome alarmed and feared an encounter. 

At Doctor Hodge's the main hody halted several hours. * * * * 
Some of them entered the doctor's enclosure and required his daughters 
to furnish them provisions, which was done to the extent of cooked 
articles on hand. The rose hushes and llower heds of the young ladies 
were also sadly despoiled hy the unwelcome visitors, hut heyond this, 
our informant says they did no damage, nor did they insult the ladies. 
The doctor was ahsent. 

From the Augusta Georgia "Constitutionalist," May 8, 1863.— The\r 
holdness and impudence in some cases were remarkahle. A couple of 
their scouts were sent into Hazlehurst an h«)ur or two hcfore their 
raid upon the place, wlv. walked holdly into the telegraj)h office and 
penned a dispatch to Jackson,* stating that the ^'ankee raiders had 
turned to the northeast. Their true character, however, heing recog- 
nized, there was some talk of arresting them, when they — the Yankees 
— drew their pistols, defied the officers and men of the town, mounted 
their horses and rejoined their commands, then within two or three 
'miles of the place, after which the whole force entered the town in 
squads of fifty and a hundred — several hours' interval hetween the van 
and rear guards — as leisurely and with as much nonchalance as our 
country people would ride into town on a gala day . 

From the Columbus { Mississipf^i) " f<ef>!thlie." — The ])ast week has 
heen an eventful one. The holdest. and we may sav one of the most 
successful, raids of cavalry that has heen known since the war hegan. 
has heen made (we say it with shame) through the very center of Mis- 
sissippi, and at the time of this writing we fear have escaped without 
the loss of a man. W'e are almost inclined to helieve the words of a 
correspondent, that the manhood "of Mississipjii had gone to the wars; 
women only were left, although some of them wore the garh of men. 
We do not know where the responsihility rests. Init wherever it is. if 
it is not a fit and i)ro])er suhject for court martial, we are afraid there 
are none * '^ * * * * It is re]K)rted that hetween four and 
five thousand federal cavalry started on this raid. They divided; >onu- 
fifteen lnmdre<l.f or perhaps a few more, stopped and gave COlonel 
Ilarteau hattle. while the remainder, three thousand strong. J marched 
direclK south. sc<niring the country, from eight to ten miles wide leav- 
ing the railroad, south of West Point, on their left. They encamped 
one night within twenty-five miles of this place. They destroyed the 
hos])ital at ( 'kolonaij and a few other huildings. passing south through 
Houston. Silam and Sfirkville. to within one mile of .Macon." and 
thence south to Xewton .Station, on the Southern road, which we learn 
the\ di'sfi-oM'd. We can learn of no serious damage done or anv ill 



•Tills cllsf)iUcli wMs wrill''n liv foloni'l rrliio'". nf ili(> Ttli. nml s«>nl (n nnzli«liiir^t !>> 
two of lli<> scouts. (Siirl>v. |). 07. ( 

+ rTntrirs .">i>(( nn-n of lli«" Sfc.'iKl I<«\vii 
tOriPi-soii's '.i.'.o iiK'ii if llif "Jill .•irnl Tili lllinil^i. 
Sllntch's ronimnnil. 
i Forl>i''s conipnn.v. • 



- ..^ < ■ 1^ 



34 

treatment to the inhabitants personally. Their main objects seem to 
have been to examine the country and robbery — taking horses, mules 
and a few negroes. 

At Starkville they robbed the inhabitants of liorses, mules, negroes, 
jewelry and money; went into the stores and threw their contents 
(principally tobacco) into the street or gave it to the negroes; caught 
the mail boy and took the mail, robbed the postofifice, but handed back 
a letter from a soldier to his wife, containing $50.00, and ordered the 
postmaster to give it to her. Doctor Montgomery was taken prisoner 
and kept in camp all night, six miles from town, and allowed to return 
home next morning, after relieving him of his watch and other valu- 
ables. Hale & Murdock's hat wagon, loaded with wool hats, passing 
through at the time, was captured. They gave the hats to the negroes 
and took the mules. Starkville can boast of better head covering for 
its negroes than any other town in the state. 

They left quite a number of broken down horses all along their 
route, supplying themselves as they went. They stated that they were 
not destroying property; that they were gentlemen. 



1 TRRflRY OF CONGRESS 

II 

'0""00"i 940 ise 8 ^ 



